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Introductory
In	this	second	part	of	the	special	volume	on	philosophical	counselling,	anoth-
er seven papers come together to complete the picture of the newly emerged 
field	which,	in	an	important	sense,	reaffirms	and	rearticulates	an	ancient	way	
of conducting psychotherapy with the aid of philosophy.
Most traditional psychotherapists will readily point out that the very substance 
of	 their	 school	or	method	 is	philosophy,	 and	 that,	while	psychotherapeutic	
intervention importantly rests on communication skills and interpretation of 











or severed that we seek philosophical and psychotherapeutic guidance. This 
context	makes	 it	 clear	 just	 how	much	 the	 two	 are	 identical:	 philosophical	
leadership and psychotherapeutic help.
Much	of	philosophical	work	with	the	clients	involves	fighting	diversion.	The	
mere  act  of  prioritising  goals  leads  to  more  focused  decision-making  and  
better	life	structure.	However,	just	as	Heidegger	believed,	introducing	struc-
ture	and	eliminating	diversions	is	difficult	 to	achieve,	though	simple	to	con-
ceptualise. It requires both cerebral and corporeal efforts. This is why phil-
osophical	practice	is	not	an	exclusively	cerebral	or	theoretical	activity:	it	is	
equally	a	form	of	training	and	development	of	self-discipline,	which	in	the	
medium term will lead to the achievement of greater aesthetic goals in life and 
thus to a lifting of the overall quality of life. It is this effect that ancient philos-
ophers	considered	the	primary	“therapeutic”	effects	of	philosophy.	When	all	
of	 the	 traditional	psychotherapeutic	“techniques”	are	deconstructed	 to	 their	
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very	 core,	 they	 leave	 the	 identical	 content:	 attempts	 to	 structure	 priorities,	
introduce	 greater	 tranquillity	 and	 focus,	 and	 lift	 the	 level	 of	 joy	 in	 every-
day	life.	However,	contrary	to	many	approaches	in	traditional	psychotherapy,	
which	describe	themselves	as	“psychodynamic”	or	motivational,	which	focus	
on	achieving	an	emotional	 “closure”	or	 “catharsis”,	philosophical	 counsel-
ling retains a vision of the necessity of an epistemic outlook and a cognitive 
benefit	 from	key	experiences.	This	means	that	 therapeutic	intervention	will	
not tend to have lasting effects if it is exhausted in a catharsis or emotional 
lightening	of	existential	experience:	every	transformative	experience,	which	
ideally	arises	in	therapy,	must	be	followed	by	a	cognitively	significant	elab-
oration and the drawing of conclusions in order to become a resource for the 
future.	This	theme	was	elaborated	at	length	by	Irvin	Yalom	and	Molyn	Leszcz	
in their existential reception of group psychotherapy.3
The epistemology of philosophical counselling comes close to an epistemol-
ogy of  life  in  general  because the insights  generated through the epistemic 
tools	involved	in	counselling,	once	they	are	cognitively	encapsulated	in	the	
mnemonic	devices	of	generalisations	arising	from	the	counselling	experience,	
lead  to  a  better  understanding  of  our  existence.  This  has  several  important  
practical	dimensions,	all	of	which	are	associated	with	Heidegger’s	distinction	
between everydayness and anxiety as an outcome of distraction. Many clients 
come to philosophical counselling for the same reasons they attend standard 
psychotherapy,	and	one	of	the	most	common	complaints	is	heightened	anx-
iety.  Understanding anxiety  is  thus  key to  a  great  proportion of  the  overall  
success	of	both	psychotherapy	and	philosophical	counselling,	and	philosophy	









among	others,	 highlights,	 are	usually	neglected	 in	 standard	psychotherapy.	
This primarily relates to the aspect of anxiety where it arises from a lack of 




A	philosophical	clarification	 of	values,	priorities	and	 tasks	seems	 to	be	 the	


































no longer able to hold together the raw experiences which the person cannot 
symbolically metabolise. 
Similarly,	 the	development	of	a	“theory”	of	 the	situation,	which	is	 the	per-
son’s	 complaint	 in	 psychotherapy	 or	 counselling,	 compensates	 the	 anxiety	
that follows a sense of powerlessness that typically accompanies such situa-
tions.	This	is	why	frequent	arguments	to	the	effect	that	practical	philosophy,	
including	philosophical	counselling,	should	draw	less	on	“theory”	and	more	
on	“experience”	are	unfounded,	given	 that	 in	many	cases,	 it	 is	 exactly	 the	
theory that makes for a change in emotional experience. This linkage between 
theory	and	emotions	has	been	long	forgotten	and	neglected,	and	it	is	one	of	
the	main	achievements	of	philosophical	practice	that	it	is	reaffirming	this	in-
terface of theory and practice and bringing it back to the fore in discussions 
about	the	therapeutic	role	of	ideas	and	critical	conversations,	both	in	psycho-
therapy and in philosophical counselling.
Put	more	radically:	one	wonders,	given	the	perspective,	whether	there	is	any	
actual difference between psychotherapy and philosophical counselling. More 
precisely,	could	it	be	that	psychotherapy, of whatever tradition and school, is 
inevitably philosophical counselling?
Freud’s	concept	of	theory	as	a	worldview	and	psychosis	as	a	theory,	combined	
with the empirical insights that the more theory there is in interpreting and 
understanding	 life	 experience,	 the	more	 bearable	 that	 experience	 becomes	
and	 is	 followed	 by	 less	 anxiety,	 suggests	 that	 therapy	 is	 theory.	However,	
much of  the  so-called  psychotherapeutic  intervention  in  acute  crises  is  pu-
tatively	 aimed	 at	 controlling	 the	 destructive	 effect,	 reducing	 suffering	 and	
thus	“helping”	the	client.	The	problem	with	such	exclusively	psychodynamic	
ideas	(it	is	worth	remembering	that	Freud	is	also	classified	as	a	“psychodyna-
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of the test is the most productive situation for science because new theories 
spring from failed experiments with old theories.4
If	theory	is	at	the	core	of	managing	life	issues,	as	Freud	believed,	then	every	
psychotherapy is  based on theory as  long as  it  results  in  lasting mnemonic 
tools	for	similar	future	situations.	Thus	every	psychotherapy	is	a	philotherapy,	







na which occur between the client and the psychotherapist also occur between 
the	client	and	the	philotherapist:	transfer	and	countertransfer,	for	example.
One	 of	 the	 important	ways	 in	which	 the	 philotherapist	will	 likely	 use	 the	
transfer is to educate the client and lead them in the direction of critical re-ex-
amination	of	 their	 habitual	models	of	 thinking,	 interpreting	 the	 reality	 and	
decision-making. This is fundamentally the substance of philosophical edu-
cation with a practical focus. Thus it could be argued that the content of psy-
chotherapy	as	much	as	of	philotherapy	 is	philosophical	 education,	 and	 the	
difference	between	the	two	is	that	philotherapy	does	the	same	job	with	a	more	
explicit and philosophically elaborate focus and breadth of methodology.
An	example	might	be	in	order	here.	One	of	the	most	commonly	used	meth-
ods	of	psychotherapy	is	Cognitive-Behavioural	Therapy	(CBT).	Some	propo-
nents of CBT argue that it is based on the philosophical tradition of Stoicism. 
Its modern emphasis is on identifying patterns of decision-making and action 
which,	as	habits,	govern	our	behaviour,	and	the	therapeutic	focus	is	on	work-
ing consciously to change these patterns to more appropriate and productive 
ones	in	the	person’s	particular	life	circumstances.
The question that poses itself in changing the pattern is about the requirements 
this process normally presupposes. There is a reason for the existing patterns. 




is never easy to change. 
To	overcome	the	resistance	to	change,	the	person	must	adopt	new	vistas	on	
one’s	life	priorities	and	one’s	very	identity.	This	is	a	philosophical	task	that	




Normative	force	arises	from	cognitive	 insights,	and	such	 insights	 require	a	
value	change	in	order	to	motivate	behaviour	change.	Thus,	it	could	be	argued,	





about values and rests on successful philosophical arguments about the very 
necessity of change and ways to put that change into effect. 
It	 is	very	difficult,	 if	not	 impossible,	 to	conduct	a	change	of	one’s	patterns	
without  exhibiting  an  appropriate  degree  of  philosophical  curiosity  about  
what is there as an alternative to the current patterns. This is a par excellence 
perspective	of	modal	logic	as	it	was	outlined	in	the	introduction	to	the	first	





what is in fact being closed to options other than the current one.
To	go	back	to	Galtung’s	distinction	between	the	“real”	and	the	“irreal”	but	




ontological	 difference	between	 the	 two	 is	 at	 the	 same	 time	 immense	 (one,	
strictly	speaking,	“exists”,	and	the	other	one,	strictly	speaking,	does	not),	and	
exceptionally small. The difference is existentially enormous because of the 
magnitude	of	experience;	however,	it	is	actually	almost	negligible	in	light	of	
what	is	required	to	completely	change	the	existential	experience.	Again,	an	
example will likely make this clearer.
Some	 time	 ago,	 I	met	 a	 young	 judge	 by	 the	 name	 of	 Ivana.	 She	 had	 just	
been	appointed	 to	 the	bar	and	 tried	 to	balance	her	sense	of	 justice	with	an	
overexposed	focus	on	her	interest.	All	new	judges	are	appointed	to	a	limited	
term	of	office,	 and	they	are	given	permanent	status	once	their	work	during	
the initial three years is evaluated. Ivana was concerned about receiving high 
evaluations,	and	for	 that	purpose,	was	very	sensitive	 to	political	 influences	
on	the	court.	She	faced	proceedings	where	she	could	not	use	judicial	practice	
because  the  facts  of  the  case  were  starkly  at  odds  with  what  would  be  the  
ordinary  decision-making in  such cases.  Her  legal  perspective  should  have  
been	clear,	as	the	law	and	the	process	conducted	that	far	pointed	to	only	one	
outcome.	However,	she	did	not	want	to	antagonise	the	political	powers	be-




of the political regime without paying the price in terms of her reputation as 
an	honest	judge.	Ruling	in	favour	of	the	member	of	the	ruling	clique	would	
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tarnish	her	as	a	 lawyer.	However,	at	 the	same	time,	 it	would	guarantee	her	
appointment	 to	a	permanent	 judicial	position.	On	 the	other	hand,	 ruling	 in	
a	 principled	 and	 legally	 sound	way,	 thus	 likely	 against	 the	 interests	 of	 the	
member	of	the	ruling	party,	would	increase	her	credibility	in	her	profession	
and might contribute to her career more in the long run. This prospect requires 






for her long term future.
Ivana’s	situation	bordered	on	nightmarish	because	the	country	where	she	was	
a	judge	was	in	political	turmoil,	and	political	pressures	on	the	judiciary	were	






illegal. The situation threatened her main career prospects. The difference be-
tween	the	‘real’	situation	in	which	Ivana	found	herself	and	an	“irreal”	one	in	
which	her	tension	would	go	down	significantly	was	existentially	major:	Ivana	
felt the burden but appeared unable to muster the knowledge and courage to 
break out of the predicament. She probably wished she was not in this situa-
tion	in	the	first	place.
However,	at	the	same	time,	this	situation	was	only	negligibly	different	from	
what a productive and reasonable outcome would have looked like. If Ivana 






thus at  the same time fending off any further political  consequences of her 
actions. 
Acting	outside	of	principle	is	what	invites	political	consequences.	Conversely,	
acting in a principled way may actually protect the person from any political 
fallout because it makes available to the person the arguments and resources 




in a fundamentally corrupt environment where cultivating unprincipled friend-




one	to	advance	one’s	career,	in	the	same	circumstances,	acting in a principled 






principled	decision’s	benefits	 are	 long	 term,	with	 the	possibility	 that	even	a	
short term fallout might be prevented or fended off if the decision was handled 
well.	If	Ivana	had	had	a	wise	advisor	or	personal	counsellor,	she	would	likely	
have	 handled	 the	 situation	 both	 honourably	 and	 beneficially	 for	 her	 career.	
However,	 as	 it	 stood,	 Ivana	was	 likely	 to	 fail	 the	 test	and	 join	 the	 ranks	of	
corruption	in	the	degraded	judiciary	she	was	a	part	of.
Similar situations exist in counselling in cases where emotional relationships 
are	at	stake.	Often	an	absorption	with	one’s	recognition	in	the	eyes	of	another	
leads	to	confrontational	situations	which,	 in	some	cases,	can	last	for	years,	
while they could be swapped for a different modal world almost in an instant. 
In	many	couples	counselling	cases,	people	are	absorbed	by	 thoughts	about	
infidelity,	or	by	the	betrayal	of	some	other	kind,	or	with	low	self-worth,	all	of	





better quality of the relationship. 
On	the	one	hand,	 the	 requirements	 to	open	such	 inroads	 into	 improvement	
seem	major:	one	must	go	beyond	one’s	values,	and	values	make	up	our	iden-
tity.	On	the	other	hand,	in	practice,	this	is	really	not	such	as	major	work	as	
it	 seems	when	 looked	upon	conceptually:	going	beyond	one’s	values	 in	an	
instant	is	a	matter	of	more	or	less	instantaneous	decision	with	few	major	con-
sequences for whom one feels one is. 
Sometimes,	in	couples	counselling,	not	acting	on	a	difficulty	or	simply	ignor-
ing the problem while working on other issues that  contribute to mutuality 
and togetherness in the relationship is the best way to preserve the relation-
ship.  This  is  easier  to  understand  if  it  is  conceptualised  in  terms  of  modal  




rather than facilitating a resolution.
The	principle	 in	conflict	 theory,	 again	advanced	by	Galtung,	 and	based	on	
modal	logic,	that	every	conflict	has	several	different	layers,	one	of	which,	typ-
ically	an	undercurrent	of	the	visible	conflict,	is	the	layer	of	cooperation,	is	an	
example of the insights which may open up inroads into more collaborative 
decision-making.
Even	when	people	conduct	active	conflicts,	 they	collaborate	on	some	level.	














satisfying aspects of the relationship (which can also be very toxic in the long 
term),	one	is	often	best	aided	by	paying	attention	to	how	one	feels	concerning	
either option.
Sometimes,	 the	actual	outcome	of	a	conflict	 between	 two	people	 is	not	all	
there	is	to	a	conflict:	in	marital	conflicts,	children	are	important	stakeholders,	
and	while	keeping	a	 low-level	conflict	 active	without	escalating	 it	 through	























conditions were there for an extremely toxic eruption of confrontation. How-
ever,	the	couple	relied	on	an	undercurrent	of	cooperation	and	mutual	attrac-
tion.	Justine	let	her	husband	keep	a	key	to	their	apartment,	under	the	excuse	
that he would walk the dog for her every morning. Thus the husband came to 
the	apartment	every	day,	saw	his	children,	walked	the	dog,	and	after	a	while,	
they even went on holidays together. After one of the summer holidays that 
they	had	spent	 together,	 Justine	 said	 to	me	 that	what	continued	 to	connect	
them	was	their	“sex	life”.
Any  experienced  counsellor  will  understand  that  the  described  situation  is  
an	extremely	dangerous	one:	where	the	sexual	attraction	between	a	couple	is	
preserved,	they	spend	considerable	time	together,	and	there	is	a	third	person	
involved,	 the	potential	 for	 violent	 conflict	 is	 very	pronounced.	Such	 situa-
tions consume a large amount of energy and maintain a high level of toxicity 
over	a	long	time.	The	more	the	two	people	are	directed	towards	each	other,	
the	more	 they	continue	 to	be	attracted	 to	one	another,	while	 their	 relation-















cations typically expected in such situations. While she and her husband did 
not	eventually	come	back	together,	they	managed	to	establish	a	collaborative	
relationship	whose	boundaries	remained	unclear	to	me,	but	which	obviously	
worked for Justine and her kids.
On	a	principled	level,	no	school	of	psychotherapy	would	encourage	such	an	










for	 everyone	directly	 concerned	 (themselves	 and	 their	 children),	 under	 the	
circumstances which were not ideal.
One	of	the	most	common	questions	that	people	ask	when	they	come	for	coun-
selling	is	how	one	can	possibly	know	what	kind	of	“jump”	to	a	different	mod-
al world one is to execute. This comes down to the question about the epis-
temic reliability of our intuitions or insights gained in everyday situations. 
It is a crucial part of counselling to point out to the client the various epis-
temic tools that might help identify the alternatives and present them in their 
almost-immediacy  in  decision-making  situations.  Sometimes  all  that  is  re-
quired	is	encouraging	trust	in	one’s	somatic	sensations,	and	sometimes	more	
needs to be done by elucidating the theory behind such sensations. In other 







an	 experience	militates	 against	 that	 value,	 the	more	 intense	 the	unpleasant	
emotion we will experience. Sometimes such simple regularities associated 




intervention strategies  both in psychotherapy and in philosophical  counsel-
ling.	They	are	conceptual	perspectives	from	a	philosophical	standpoint,	and	
at	the	same	time,	therapeutic	tactics	in	psychotherapy.	This	principle	is	com-
patible with the idea that every psychotherapy is philosophical counselling.











not purport to substitute the actual substance of what it introduces the reader 
to. That is where an introduction must stop.
Aleksandar	Fatić
